Cheating in contests
We examine the impact of regulation on the doping decisions of athletes in a Tullock contest. The regulatory measures we consider are greater monitoring by sports authorities and a lowering of the prize in the contest. When legal efforts and illegal drugs are substitutes, an increase in anti-doping regulation may, counterintuitively, increase the levels of doping activity by athletes. Anti-doping regulation can also have the undesirable consequence of decreasing legal efforts; in our model, this always occurs when legal efforts and illegal drugs are complements, and under certain circumstances when they are substitutes.
© Copyright 2016 Journal of Sports Economics. SAGE Publications. All rights reserved.
| Subjects: | |
|---|---|
| Notations: | organisations and events theory and social foundations |
| Tagging: | Betrug |
| Published in: | Journal of Sports Economics |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
2016
|
| Online Access: | https://doi.org/10.1177/1527002514542438 |
| Volume: | 17 |
| Issue: | 7 |
| Pages: | 736-747 |
| Document types: | article |
| Level: | advanced |